This study contributes to an important, but under-researched, topic on China by empirically examining the theory of compensating wage differentials for occupational risks in urban labour markets. Drawing on two datasets -one national for all workers and one from the Pearl River Delta for migrant workers -we examine the relationship between wages and occupational risks, and estimate the risk premium for health hazards. The results show that having risky jobs, especially those associated with dust, has a significant negative effect on hourly wages. The negative risk premium accounts for approximately 10 per cent of all workers' hourly wage in safe jobs using the national dataset and 1.8 per cent of migrant workers' hourly wage in safe jobs in the Pearl River Delta. With the national data, males, migrant workers and manual workers incur a wage penalty for exposure to dust, chemical substances, biological hazards and other health hazards. Only urban locals earn a significantly positive wage premium for exposure to chemical substances. We offer several explanations for the negative wage premium in the context of China's urban labour market.
Introduction
China is regarded as the 'world's factory'. The occupational risks confronting China's urban workers are often high. In China it is estimated that almost 16 million enterprises use toxic and hazardous materials in production and that 200 million workers are potentially exposed to job hazards (Chen & Chan, 2010) . Between 2000 and 2010, 152,017 cases of occupational diseases were filed, accounting for 20 per cent of all cases since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949; and 1 in 200 workers suffered from occupational diseases due to exposure to hazards, such as dust and toxic chemicals (Ding et al., 2013) . The majority of industrial accidents and deaths occur in private or informal sectors in which rural-urban migrant workers and other low-skilled workers are concentrated (Chen & Chan, 2010) .
A survey of six cities in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province (also the geographical focus of one of the datasets used in this paper) in 1994 suggested that one-third of migrant workers believed that their health was adversely affected by working in noisy, dusty and poisonous working environments (Tan 2004 ). Every year a significant number of migrant workers, who are not properly trained in operating machines, lose their fingers, hands or arms, and, thus, become physically disabled (Chan 2001 , Lam 2000 . Many suffer chronic diseases due to exposure to hazardous dusts and toxic chemicals. A large number of benzene poisoning and pneumoconiosis cases have been reported in the construction, mining and manufacturing sectors, in which migrants are concentrated, and a majority of these affected workers are no longer able to work (Xiang 2004) . Finally, each year approximately 10,000 workers die in mining accidents, many of whom are migrants, accounting for 60 per cent of the fatalities in the global mining sector (Nielsen et al. 2005 ).
The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWD) suggests that job characteristics, such as work environment and workplace safety, can be determinants of labour market outcomes and wage dispersion (Rosen, 1974) . In theory, wage premiums are paid to compensate employees who work in undesirable conditions in terms of health and safety risk (Thaler & Rosen, 1976) . Positive compensating wages act as a reward to 'compensate' workers in arduous or dangerous jobs. Compensating wage differentials are, thus, the prices at which good working conditions are bought from, or bad working conditions are sold to, workers who take on less desirable jobs.
A number of studies on the compensating wage for occupational risk exist for developed economies (Smith, 1983; Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) . There is, however, little research for developing countries and, in particular, China. The first Chinese study was Guo and Hammitt (2009) who estimate the economic value of mortality risk for those with an urban hukou (household registration). It found a positive correlation between wages and occupational fatality risk, but acknowledge that a shortcoming of their study is that they do not have data for migrant workers.
Because migrant workers have fewer job alternatives than those with an urban household registration, they may be willing to accept less compensation for risk.
A second study for China, which is also restricted to those with an urban hukou, is Scheffel (2014) . It finds positive wage premiums for urban workers exposed to high temperature and toxic environments, but wage penalties for outdoor work, those on temporary contracts and those engaged in high work intensity. In addition to not having data on migrant workers, other limitations of this study are that it uses relatively old data (from the 1995 China Household Income Project) and that it focuses on adverse work characteristics, rather than on-the-job risks. There is only one study for China, which covers both urban and rural workers (Qin et al., 2013) . It finds that mortality risk had a significant positive effect on earnings; however, nonfatal injury risk has a significantly negative effect on wages, implying that workers in risky jobs received a negative wage premium. An important limitation of this study, however, is that it did not correct for selection bias and endogeneity.
Overall, each of these studies for China have several limitations. First, they use jobrelated accidents and mortality by industries to proxy for occupational hazards, which ignores the heterogeneity in actual risk experienced by individual workers and thus results in potential bias (Purse, 2004) . Second, these studies do not address the potential endogeneity of occupational risk and potential issues of omitted variable bias, which may generate downward bias in the estimation of CWD in the regression analysis (Garen, 1988; Viscusi, 1980) . Third, existing studies are limited in that they do not they consider the effect of specific occupational hazards on workers' wages.
In this study, we examine the relationship between wages and job risk in China's urban labour market and estimate the wage premium for undertaking hazardous jobs.
To do so, we draw on two datasets. The first is a survey collected in 2008 containing information on rural-urban migrants in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province (hereafter referred to as the PRDS). The advantage of the PRDS is that it focuses on migrant workers, who are disproportionally represented in hazardous jobs, and was administered in a major migrant-receiving area. The disadvantage of the PRDS is that it does not contain data on urban workers or specific types of risks. The second is the 2012 China Labour Force Dynamics Survey containing information on rural-urban migrant and urban workers from provinces in east, central and western China (hereafter referred to as the CLDS). It has the advantage that it contains data on migrant and urban workers, distinguishes between six different types of risky jobs and is a nationally representative survey of urban China across all regions.
We extend the existing literature applying CWD theory to China in several directions.
The first is that instead of employing number of job-related accidents and mortality by industries to proxy for occupational hazards, we use employees' perception of risk that measures the subjective risk experienced by individual workers. The second is that we employ several econometric methods to address potential omitted variables bias and endogeneity problems associated with estimating the CWD for job risk. The third is that the CLDS allows us to examine the effect of specific occupational hazards on workers' wages. The fourth is that we examine how the CWD for job risk varies for different subsamples of workers across the wage distribution. Finally, the use of multiple datasets provides the findings with a higher level of robustness.
Methodological Issues (a) Construction of the risk variable
The ideal measure of fatal and non-fatal occupational risks should reflect the perceptions of both employees and employers (Viscusi & Aldy 2003) . Nevertheless, only a few studies use workers' subjective assessments of job risks and little research is based on employers' perceptions of occupational risk (Hersch & Viscusi 1990 , Gerking, de Haan & Schulze 1988 . The most widely adopted alternative method is to use data on job-related accidents and mortality (such as that categorized by occupations or industries) or workers' compensation records as the proxy of occupational risk (Lanoie et al. 1995 , Viscusi 2004 , Viscusi & Aldy 2007 . However, this method only provides an estimate of average risk and ignores heterogeneity in actual risk experienced by individual workers, resulting in potential bias (Purse 2004 ).
To measure the risk variable we use employees' perception of risk. This implies, but does not directly measure, hidden long-term risk, which is also a limitation of previous studies. Nevertheless, it is a better measure of risk than official industry data on industry fatalities, especially given the well-known problems of reliability of such official data in China. Our measure of risk means that the analysis is based on current risks perceived by workers. While we do not have data on employers' perception of risk, it is reasonable to conclude that employers must know these risks as well.
(b) Endogeneity of occupational risk and selection bias
In most studies, occupational risk is assumed to be exogenous. However, Viscusi (1980) argues that occupational risk may be correlated with workers' income through the wealth effect. Workers with better human capital and higher earnings potential are more likely to experience a wealth effect and choose jobs with less risk (Viscusi, 1980) . Garen (1988) also noted that unobserved characteristics might affect an individual's productivity in dangerous situations and hence the premium for occupational risk. We use two-stage least squares (2SLS), weighted least squares (WLS) (with CLDS) and propensity score matching (PSM) to address the endogeneity of occupational risk and unobserved heterogeneity related to selection of risky jobs.
(c) Omitted variables bias
Unobserved ability may bias results through two channels. First, workers with better ability are more likely to obtain higher earnings. Second, workers with better ability may have more active social communication and better social networks, which contribute to higher earnings. Garen (1988) (p. 9) argues that 'individuals may systematically differ in unobserved characteristics which affect their productivity and earnings in dangerous jobs and so these unobservables will affect their choice of job risk'. These unobserved characteristics, such as having a 'smart head and nimble hands' at work, could enhance workers' productivity and reduce risk incurred in dangerous jobs. Some studies attempt to minimize this bias by using the education of the worker's parent as a proxy for unobserved ability, based on the assumption that the children of better educated parents have relatively more ability (Rubinstein & Tsiddon 2004) . We also use the education of the worker's father as a proxy to mitigate omitted variable bias due to unobserved individual ability.
Data (a) Dataset 1: PRDS
The first dataset used in this study was collected in 2008 by the School of Sociology and Anthropology at Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China as part of a research project entitled Rural Migrant Workers in Cities of the Pearl River Delta. The data collection followed a proportional sampling framework that distributed the sample across nine cities, according to the actual gender, industrial and regional distribution of migrant workers obtained from the results of provincial population census' conducted by the Chinese government. In order to maintain representativeness, no more than three responses were selected from each enterprise. Altogether, 2,505 valid responses were received that contained information related to occupational risk; of which, 1,832 workers (73.1 per cent) were engaged in safe jobs, while 673 workers (26.9 per cent) were engaged in risky jobs in poisonous and harmful work environments.
2 The other information collected in the survey pertained to earnings, employment status, employee benefits, and personal and family characteristics.
[ Table 1 here] Table A1 .
(b) Dataset 2: CLDS
The second dataset used in this paper is from the 2012 CLDS, collected by the Center for Social Science Surveys at Sun Yat-Sen University. The survey adopted multistage cluster, stratified and probability proportional to size sampling methods. Considering the differences in socioeconomic development and the sizes of the population and labour force between east, central and west China, six sample frames were designed in this survey, including large and small population provinces in the east, central and west regions separately. In addition, another two sample frames, the Pearl River Delta region and non-Pearl River Delta region, were designed to increase the representativeness of Guangdong province. workers were exposed to biological hazards and 17 workers exposed to other hazards. Table 2 presents the hourly wage for the full sample (Panel A) and sub-samples (Panel B) for safe jobs and specific types of risky jobs. For the full sample, the average hourly wage for workers in risky jobs is 17.64 RMB, which is lower than the corresponding amount for workers in safe jobs (20.16 RMB). Among those in risky jobs, workers who were exposed to radioactive and chemical substances earn the highest hourly wage, 18.56 and 18.23 RMB respectively, while those exposed to other hazards earn the lowest hourly wage, only 9.89 RMB. For the subsamples, the average hourly wage for workers undertaking risky jobs is consistently lower than that of those undertaking safe jobs, which is consistent with the pattern in the full sample.
The wage gap within the male subsample is the largest, 4.78 RMB, while that within the female subsample is the smallest, only 1.22 RMB. The t-test results suggest that significant wage differentials exist in the full sample and for males, migrants and manual workers. The above descriptive statistics imply that workers in risky jobs are not treated equally with their peers in safe jobs in terms of the hourly wage. The CLDS also collected other information related to earnings, employment status, employee benefits, and personal and family characteristics. Full descriptive statistics for all other variables employed from the CLDS are provided in Table A2 .
[ Table 2 here]
Econometric Method
To examine the extent to which the CWD contributes to wage inequality between workers in safe and risky jobs, we estimate the following hedonic wage model:
( 1) Here, lnW is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage for the ith person and Risk is the core independent variable for occupational risk. To measure the risk variable we use employees' perception of risk. Risk=1, if respondents reported that their job was not safe (PRDS) or that they had been exposed to the specific hazards in their work (CLDS), otherwise Risk=0. P is a vector of personal characteristics. W is a vector of employment characteristics. We include industries and occupations to capture interindustry and inter-occupation wage differentials. R is a vector of dummy variables for the economic tier of cities classified by the government (for the PRDS only), or for cities located in the east, central and west of China, which is included to control for unobserved heterogeneity in different regions (for the CLDS only). As discussed above, job risk is endogenous. Since there is no valid instruments in either dataset for job risk, we employ alternatively PSM, the synthetic instrumental variable method proposed by Lewbel (2012) and, for the CLDS, Garen's (1988) modified selectionbias correction technique, in order to examine the robustness of the main findings.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, which has been widely used to quantify the contributions of differences in productivity-related characteristics and 
where represents the hourly wage differentials between workers in risky jobs i and safe jobs j and is the counterfactual hourly wage distribution; that is, the conditional hourly wage distribution of workers in safe jobs if they have the same marginal return on various skills as those in risky jobs. The first term on the righthand side is the explainable component of the hourly wage gap attributable to the group difference in productivity characteristics, and the second term is the unexplainable component of the hourly wage gap attributable to the group difference in the returns to productivity characteristics. The unexplainable component of the hourly wage gap is attributed to the compensating wage differentials or risk premium.
Similar to other decomposition methods, a methodological issue with these two decomposition approaches relates to the index number or path-dependence issue. The risk premium in Equation (2) can be alternatively estimated based on the pattern of 3 The FFL decomposition model based on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method can be expressed as follows:
where represents wage differentials between workers in risky jobs i and safe jobs j at the θth quantile and is the counterfactual wage distribution.
hourly wage determination for workers in risky jobs or safe jobs. Results based on the two patterns will be different and will be sensitive to the chosen path of estimation.
To ensure the robustness of the findings, in the results section below we report the means for both sets of decomposition results based on the different patterns. Table 3 show the results from the OLS regression in which migrant workers' hourly wage is the dependent variable. The results indicate that having a risky job has a significant negative effect on migrant workers' hourly wage. Holding other factors constant, on average migrant workers who undertake risky jobs earn 3.38 per cent less in hourly wages than those undertaking safe jobs. The findings for the other variables are generally as expected and consistent with prior studies for China and elsewhere.
Results

(a) PRDS Results
[ Table 3 here]
As discussed above, there are potential omitted variables bias and endogeneity problems in estimating the CWD for job risks. As a robustness check on the OLS estimates, we present estimates using the Lewbel (2012) method and PSM in Table 4 .
The Lewbel (2012) 2SLS method suggests that those doing risky jobs earn 11.23 per cent less in hourly wages than those in safe jobs. The findings from PSM, reported in Panel B of Table 4 , suggest that migrants in risky jobs earn between 4 per cent and 8.5 per cent less than those in safe jobs. These findings are consistent with prior studies, which suggest that the risk premium estimated based on the OLS results are substantially biased downwards (Deng & Wang, 2013; Garen, 1988; Sandy & Elliott, 1996) and, together, suggest that there is a negative wage premium for risky jobs.
[ Table 4 here]
To conduct the decomposition, we ran the same specifications in Table 3 (excluding the factor of risky jobs) on the hourly wage of migrant workers in safe and risky jobs, 13 respectively. The coefficients of the important variables had the expected signs and were statistically significant. The results of F-tests suggested that there are significant differences in the determinants of the hourly wage in safe and risky jobs at the mean and most quantiles. 4 The structural difference in returns to productivity characteristics between workers in risky and safe jobs indicated that they are treated differently in the urban labour market. As discussed above, the different treatment may be the outcome of wage premiums for undertaking undesirable working conditions.
Based on the estimated coefficients of each group, the Oaxaca-Blinder and FFL decomposition approaches are employed to evaluate the risk premium at the mean hourly wage and across the distribution. Table 5 presents the decomposition results of mean hourly wage differentials and distributional differentials between risky and safe jobs. The explained portion measures the hourly wage gap caused by the difference in productivity-related characteristics between the two groups. The unexplained portion measures the hourly wage gap caused by the difference in returns to productivityrelated characteristics between the members of the two groups, which could be attributed to the compensating wage differentials or risk premium. The hourly wage differential in this study is defined as the hourly wage of workers in risky jobs minus that of workers in safe jobs. Therefore, a negative value in the decomposition results represents an offsetting effect on the earnings differential between the two groups.
[ Table 5 here]
The results show that migrant workers in safe jobs, rather than those in risky jobs, are compensated by a wage premium, consistent with the findings from the regression results as shown above. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results show that the mean log hourly wage gap between workers in risky and safe jobs is -0.01; of which, -0.03 can be attributed to the negative wage premium. This represents almost three times the raw hourly wage differentials, accounting for 1.81 per cent of the hourly wage of migrant workers in safe jobs. The quantile-based FFL decomposition shows the risk premium across the distribution of hourly wages. The results suggest that workers in risky jobs suffer discrimination in the form of negative wage premiums at almost all wage levels. The unexplained hourly wage gap ranges from -0.01 to -0.07, denoting 0.65 to 3.7 per cent of migrant workers' hourly wage in safe jobs.
(b) CLDS Results
We first examine the manner in which general job risk affect workers' hourly wage. (Dorman & Hagstrom, 1998; Leigh, 1995) . In addition, China's urban labour market has exhibited increased unemployment since the 1990s (Liu, 2012) . The results from another study showed that the CWD decreased dramatically with an increase in the unemployment rate (Guo & Hammitt, 2009) . In light of these potential missingvariable bias problems, we include gradually employment characteristics (including industry dummy variables) and region dummy variables in columns 2 and 3. All three results show that having a risky job has a significant negative effect on workers' hourly wage, after controlling for other factors potentially correlated with wages.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate greater absolute values of the coefficient of general job risk after the incorporation of the employment characteristics and dummy variables for regions. Results from the full specifications in Column 3 indicate that holding other factors constant, on average, workers who undertake risky jobs earn 9.5 per cent less in hourly wages than their counterparts who are undertaking safe jobs.
[ Table 6 here]
A possible reason for the negative relationship between occupational risk and wages is that, thus far, we do not consider heterogeneity in general job risk among workers.
Risk levels are different across occupational hazards and worker's perception of risk may also be different across groups (Guo & Hammitt, 2009; Hersch, 1998; Qin et al., 2013; Siebert & Wei, 1998; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) . To address this point, we investigate the effects of general and specific risks on the hourly wage of the full sample as well as subsamples based on gender, hukou status and occupation. As shown in Table 7 , in terms of the full sample, we only find a significant negative effect of dust on the hourly wage, while the effects of other job risks are not significant. In terms of subsamples, having a risky job has a significant negative effect on the hourly wage of males, migrants and manual workers, while the effects on the hourly wage of females and urban locals are not significant. Males exposed to general jobs risk earn an hourly wage 13.25 per cent lower, migrants earn 20.50 per cent lower and manual workers earn 25.61 per cent lower than their counterparts with no risk, all else equal. This result may reflect the fact that females and urban locals are far more likely to work in jobs that would pose less health and safety risks (Leeth & Ruser, 2003; Wang et al., 2014) . Moreover, males and migrant workers earn negative CWD for exposure to dust, chemical substances, biological hazards and other hazards, and manual workers earn negative CWD for the exposure to dust, chemical substances and other hazards. In contrast, urban locals are compensated by a significant positive wage premium, though at a lesser extent (only 0.36 per cent higher) than that suggested by related studies, for occupational exposure to chemical substances. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and previous studies (Guo & Hammitt, 2009; Lott & Manning, 2000) .
[Tables 7 & 8 here]
In Table 8 we report the results of several tests to ensure the robustness of our results.
First, the general job risk measured as a binary variable in the basic regression is replaced by the risk level of occupations measured as an ordinal variable. In addition to information on job risks, the CLDS survey also collected information on severity of industrial injury, which was assessed on a five-point scale by asking respondents the severity of their industrial injuries (1=resulting in disability, 2=staying in hospital for more than ten days, 3=staying in hospital for less than ten days, 4=simple treatment or having one day off, 5=having no industrial injury). We use the degree of industrial injury by specific risks to proxy for the risk level. The calculation results show that the risk level of chemical substances is the highest (4.84), followed by biological hazards, dust, radioactive substances, physical hazards and other hazards. The risk levels of specific risks are rated on a six-point ordinal scale, ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 6 (the highest), and the risk level of safe jobs is coded as 0. Since workers may suffer from more than one specific risk in their jobs, the ratings on the scales are added together to get a total score for the risk level of the respondent's job. We then replace the general job risk by the risk level of occupations, and re-estimate the hedonic wage model in Column 3 of Table 6 . The results show that risk levels have a significant negative effect on workers' hourly wage. An increase in the risk level is associated with a 1.18 per cent decrease in workers' hourly wage.
To address potential omitted variables bias and endogeneity, WLS and 2SLS are employed to obtain consistent estimates of coefficients. In the WLS procedure, we follow a similar strategy, and use similar variables, to Garen (1988) , such as number of children, non-labour income, the ownership status of the respondent's house and whether the respondent had a health examination before undertaking his/her job, to instrument for the choice of risky jobs. The parameter estimates of the risk equation
show that workers who have more children and higher non-labour income are less likely to engage in risky jobs, while those who undertook a health examination before commencing work are more likely to choose risky jobs. 5 We find that homeownership status has no significant effect on the choice of risky jobs. Our findings are consistent with those reported in previous studies (Garen, 1988; Sandy & Elliott, 1996) .
The WLS estimates are reported in Panel A, Column 2 of Table 8 . After addressing potential endogeneity and omitted variables bias, the coefficient on general job risk is still negative and significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. However, the absolute magnitude of the estimated general job risk coefficient increases from 0.0950 to 0.3038. After controlling for other variables, on average workers who undertake risky jobs earn 26.20 per cent less in hourly wages than their counterparts in safe jobs.
This result suggests that the residuals estimated based on the probit results, which are found to be positively correlated with unobserved personal disposition (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010) , have a significant effect on the hourly wage of workers.
The 2SLS estimate, based on Lewbel (2012) , is also presented in Panel A of The results from PSM are presented in Panel B of Table 8 . The findings from all three matching methods suggest that workers in risky jobs incur a wage penalty with hourly wages between 7.9 per cent and 10.3 per cent lower than for those in safe jobs. The results from OLS and the robustness tests, together, suggest that those working in risky jobs suffer a wage penalty, relative to those working in safe jobs.
In Table 9 we employ decomposition approaches to evaluate the risk premium. The results show that workers in risky jobs are compensated by a negative wage premium, both at the mean hourly wage and across the distribution, which is consistent with the results from the PRDS. The mean log hourly wage gap between workers in risky and safe jobs is -0.05; of which, -0.35 can be attributed to the negative wage premium, accounting for 9.81 per cent of workers' hourly wage in safe jobs. The unexplained hourly wage gap varies from -0.03 to -0.88 across the distribution of hourly wages, accounting for 1.35 to 23.47 per cent of workers' hourly wage in safe jobs.
Discussion
The theory of CWD suggests that workers engaged in risky jobs will be compensated in the form of a wage premium compared with those working in safe jobs. While studies for labour markets in developed countries have generally reached results consistent with what the theory predicts (Thaler and Rosen 1976 , Dorsey and Walzer 1983 , Moore and Viscusi 1990 , some studies have found that there is an insignificant, or even negative, relationship between occupational risk and wages (Moore and Viscusi 1988 , Leigh 1991 , Dorsey 1983 . The findings in this study for both the PRDS and the CLDS suggests that there is a negative relationship between occupational hazard and hourly wages in China's urban labour market.
There are several potential reasons for this finding. A key assumption underpinning the theory of CWD is that there is a competitive labour market. The negative risk premium may reflect the non-competitive nature of China's urban labour market. A large body of literature shows that China's urban labour market is highly segmented, such as local and non-local segmentation, urban-rural segmentation and state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOE segmentation (Knight & Yueh, 2009; Wang et al., 2014) . Workers in a segmented labour market do not have the complete liberty to change jobs whenever they feel inclined to so do. This applies a fortiori to less skilled workers (Hopkins, 1995) . For instance, impeded by their hukou status, migrant workers often undertake low-tier jobs characterized by labour-intensive, low-skilled and hazardous conditions which are typically shunned by urban locals . They may be willing to accept much less or even negative wage compensation for job risk due to the unavailability of alternative employment, even if they are aware of the occupational risk and understand their rights under the Labour Law.
A second plausible explanation for the negative risk premium is the lack of bargaining power and information on occupational hazards. China has pursued rapid economic growth. In order to attract investment, some local governments collude with investors to keep wages down and ignore workplace health and safety. In some cases, they even put up barriers to impede monitoring by occupational health and safety (OHS) agencies (Chen & Chan, 2010) . There are many instances in which the ill effects of occupational hazards do not show any effect until years into the future. In this case, workers, especially migrant workers and those with low human capital who are disproportionally represented in the private and informal sectors, might have little, or no, bargaining power with employers to claim the wage premium for undertaking risky jobs and/or are unable to obtain full information in relation to occupational risk.
Although more than half of workers in the CLDS had joined a trade union, it is generally accepted that trade unions at the city or firm level are still weak and their capacity to bargain with employers and provide information to employees is limited (Chan, 2005; Cheng et al., 2013 ). This perspective is reinforced when we interact the risk variable with the dummy variable for trade union membership in the CLDS.
When we include this interaction term in the wage regression model in Table 6 , column 3, we find that it has no significant effect on workers' hourly wage. 6 Third, people are not invariably rational decision-makers as assumed by the theory.
They have a propensity to overestimate the probability of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative, or low probability, events (Akerlof & Dickens 1982) . Migrant workers in China, in particular, are well-known for being myopic when it comes to discounting the potential costs to their health in the future from working in hazardous conditions (see eg. Li, 2008) . Traumatic deaths from work-related causes are relatively rare. Hence, workers may believe that 'it cannot happen to me', meaning that cognitive dissonance results in the underestimation of work-related risks and a disinclination to seek safer alternative employment.
A fourth possible reason for why our results differ from those obtained by many previous studies might be related to the construction of risk measures. Most CWD studies use job-related mortality and injuries data by industry and occupation to reflect occupational risk and obtain a positive nexus between work-related fatalities or injuries and wages (Moore & Viscusi, 1990; Qin et al., 2013; Viscusi & Aldy, 2007) .
However, as discussed above, the risk measures in these studies suffer from some deficiencies. We differ from many studies in that we employ subjectively measured job risk to examine workplace health and safety and workers' compensation. PRDS asked a yes/no question regarding whether their job is risky. CLDS asked workers six specific questions as to whether their jobs exposed them to dust, radioactive substances, chemical substances, physical hazards, biological hazards and other hazards. From these questions, we can see that the risk measures in this study are potentially much broader than in many previous studies.
These occupational hazards could measure not only the risks of death and injury, but also imply hidden long-term risk and other risks that are harmful to individuals' health. The former two risks tend to be relatively rare events (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) , while the latter two are more common and usually more difficult for workers to claim compensation. For instance, previous studies have estimated a wage regression model with both fatal and non-fatal risks and found non-significant coefficients on non-fatal risk measures (Guo & Hammitt, 2009; Kniesner & Leeth, 1991) , while other studies even found a negative effect of non-fatal risk for both the full sample and blue-collar workers' wages (Hintermann et al., 2010) . Very few studies use similar risk measures to this study to examine the relationship between wages and perceived occupational risks. The results suggest that undesirable working conditions, such as extreme cold and heat, vibrations and hazards have a significantly negative effect on wages (Brown, 1980; Hammitt & Ibarrarán, 2006) , while the effect of exposure to the risk of liver diseases on wages is not significant (Liu & Hammitt, 1999) . Although Guo & Hammitt (2009) found a significant positive effect of exposure to harsher working environments (including working under ground or under water, working in extreme high or low temperatures and working in a toxic environment or other dangerous situation ) on wages in China, their conclusion is only applicable to urban workers.
Conclusion
While there is a large economics literature concerning the CWD for occupational risks in developed economies, there are few studies for China. In this paper, we draw on two datasets to estimate the wage premium/penalty for job risks. Compared with previous studies of this sort for China, our contribution has several advantages. We use employees' perception of risk; we employ several econometric methods to address potential omitted variables bias and endogeneity; we examine the effect of specific occupational hazards on workers' wages; and we examine how the CWD for job risk varies for migrant and urban workers across the wage distribution.
Our main empirical finding from both datasets is that having a risky job has a significant negative effect on workers' hourly wage. While this result is inconsistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, we have suggested that there are plausible explanations for a negative risk premium in the context of a transitional labour market, such as that in China. First, workers are not able to readily change jobs in the multiple segmented urban labour market in China. Hence, they have to accept a much lower, or even negative, wage compensation for risk due to the unavailability of alternative employment. Second, workers have little, or no, bargaining power to claim the risk premium and/or are unable to obtain full information in relation to occupational risk, even if some of them have joined a trade union. Third, workers are invariably not rational as the theory suggests and may unduly discount the costs of a hazardous working environment. Fourth, the risk measure we used in this study is different from that in many other studies in terms of coverage of risk. The subjectively measured job risk measures the risks of death and injury, the hidden long-term risk and other risks that are harmful to individuals' health. The latter two are more common and usually more difficult for workers to claim compensation.
We examine the effects of general and specific risks on the hourly wage of full sample and subsamples using CLDS. The results show that general job risk only has a significant negative effect on the hourly wage of males, migrants and manual workers.
This may imply that females and urban locals are more likely to work in jobs that would pose less health and safety risks. Males, migrant workers and manual workers earn a negative CWD for exposure to dust, chemical substances, biological hazards and other hazards. Consistent with other studies, urban locals earn a significant positive wage premium for exposure to chemical substances.
Our results contain several important policy implications. The results suggest that lack of labour mobility, collective bargaining power and information on occupational hazards are some of the leading causes of a negative risk premium in China's urban labour market. Therefore, there is a need to further reform the urban labour market and the hukou system which is generally believed to be the most important reason for the multiple segmentations in the urban labour market (Meng & Zhang, 2001; Wang et al., 2014) . The Chinese government, on the one hand, needs to establish effective and fair compensation arrangements for workers, and to improve the OHS system in all sectors, especially in the private and informal sectors, in which migrants and workers with low human capital are disproportionately concentrated. Studies have found that the non-state sector has much worse OHS practices than the state sector (Chen & Chan, 2010) . In addition, the government needs to grant trade unions more administrative power to monitor workplace health and safety, to become involved more directly in labour affairs and disputes and to organize collective bargaining. 
